With the presidential election just weeks away on 31 May, Colombia finds itself confronting a sharp deterioration in security that has thrust the failures of the past four years into the spotlight. While the government’s “total peace” strategy promised dialogue and an end to decades of conflict, independent assessments show it has instead allowed armed groups to regroup, expand and grow stronger — setting the stage for the current surge in violence.
President Gustavo Petro’s flagship policy, launched in 2022, involved offering simultaneous negotiations and ceasefires to a wide array of rebel factions, guerrilla remnants and criminal organisations. The intention was ambitious: to bring peace through dialogue rather than sustained military pressure. In reality, the approach has produced what analysts call the “total peace paradox” — a reduction in direct confrontations between state forces and some armed groups during ceasefire periods, but a clear strengthening and territorial expansion of those very groups.
Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and Colombian think tanks such as the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) reveal the scale of this shift. The number of fighters across illegal armed organisations has risen dramatically — by roughly 85 per cent since 2017 in some estimates — reaching at least 25,000–27,000 combatants and auxiliaries by early 2026. These groups now exert influence in more than 580 municipalities. Inter-group clashes have increased markedly, as factions compete for control of lucrative illicit economies while facing less consistent pressure from the state.
The Central General Staff (EMC), the largest FARC dissident faction led by Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias Iván Mordisco, stands out as a prime example. Having rejected the 2016 peace accord from the beginning, the EMC used periods of negotiated respite to consolidate control over key coca-growing zones — particularly in the remote Micay Canyon in Cauca — as well as illegal gold mines and Pacific drug-trafficking corridors. When talks broke down in 2024, the group shifted to asymmetric tactics, including drones and explosives, to counter military operations and assert dominance.
Underlying drivers remain deeply entrenched. Colombia continues to be a major global producer of coca leaf, and control of cultivation areas, processing routes and export networks generates vast profits that sustain recruitment, weaponry and parallel governance. Illegal mining provides an additional revenue stream. In many rural regions, particularly in southwestern departments such as Cauca and Valle del Cauca, the state’s presence is limited, leaving communities exposed to extortion, forced recruitment (often of indigenous and Afro-Colombian youth) and restrictive social controls imposed by armed actors. Local voices frequently describe these dynamics only in private, citing fears of retaliation from both rebels and political pressures.
Critics argue that the “total peace” policy lacked rigorous enforcement mechanisms. Ceasefires often failed to curb territorial expansion, child recruitment or extortion, effectively giving armed groups breathing space to rebuild. Elizabeth Dickinson of the International Crisis Group has highlighted how such pauses enabled groups to sustain an “asymmetrical war” against the state. Javier Garay, a political science professor at Externado University in Bogotá, has described the approach as naive, based on the assumption that a conciliatory posture would elicit genuine reciprocity from hardened criminal and rebel networks.
Recent reports from ACLED and other monitors confirm that while some headline clashes with security forces declined temporarily, violence against civilians and competition between armed groups rose. Think tanks such as InSight Crime and the Fundación Ideas para la Paz have documented how the policy inadvertently contributed to the consolidation of parallel governance structures in neglected rural territories.
The electoral context has intensified these tensions. Petro is constitutionally barred from seeking re-election. His Historic Pact candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda, has committed to continuing the dialogue-based strategy. In contrast, conservative contenders such as Senator Paloma Valencia of the Democratic Centre and independent lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella advocate applying stronger military pressure on armed groups before any renewed negotiations. Security concerns — including the lingering impact of political violence in previous cycles — are expected to weigh heavily on voters.
Sergio Guzmán, a Bogotá-based political risk analyst, notes that the current security crisis provides political ammunition for all sides. Government supporters may argue it underscores the need for accelerated agreements, while opponents will point to it as proof that a tougher stance is required.
A decade after the landmark 2016 peace accord with the FARC ended the largest guerrilla war in the Western Hemisphere, implementation gaps in rural governance, land reform and alternative development for coca farmers have left space for dissident factions and criminal networks to thrive. Petro’s “total peace” sought to address multiple actors at once but struggled with fragmentation, verification challenges and the powerful economic incentives of illicit economies.
As Colombians head to the polls, the central question is whether the next government can combine credible negotiations with more effective territorial control and targeted pressure on criminal financing. Without addressing these structural weaknesses more decisively, cycles of fragile truces and renewed escalation risk becoming entrenched. The election will test whether voters demand a sharper course correction or continued emphasis on dialogue in the face of persistent instability.
