In the rugged Himalayas, where borders are as much a matter of history and perception as of maps and rivers, Nepal’s new prime minister has offered an unusually candid assessment of his country’s long-running territorial quarrel with India. Speaking in parliament on May 31st, Balendra Shah—better known as Balen Shah, the former mayor of Kathmandu who swept to power earlier this year—acknowledged that encroachments have gone both ways. “It is not only India that has encroached on Nepalese territories,” he said, “but Nepal has also encroached on India’s territories in many places.” Both neighbours, he , should sit down as friends, consult historians, surveyors and experts, and sort it out.
Nepal and India share an open border of some 1,850 kilometres, porous enough for people, goods and grievances to flow freely. Much of it was shaped by the Treaty of Sugauli (or Segowlee) of 1816 after its defeat by the British East India Company. The treaty set the Kali (or Mahakali) River as the western boundary. The trouble lies in identifying precisely where that river begins. Nepal maintains that the source is at Limpiyadhura, placing the areas of Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura firmly on its side. India, which administers them as part of Uttarakhand, takes a different view of the watershed and historical practice. The dispute flared notably in 2020 when Nepal published a new map incorporating the contested territory. India has long dismissed such claims as untenable.
“The Nepal government has officially sent a diplomatic note to India, mentioning the issue of encroachment of territories by India, including Lipulekh, and we have already received their response,” Shah told the Parliament, “Both the countries have agreed to resolve the issue sitting together with the help of historians, surveyors and concerned experts through diplomatic means.”
Mr Shah’s remarks, made in his maiden parliamentary appearance, were striking not just for their symmetry but for their timing. They came a day before a delegation from his ruling Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), led by the charismatic chairman Rabi Lamichhane, was scheduled to fly to Delhi at the invitation of Nitin Nabin, the president of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The visit is framed as party-to-party engagement—”discussing organisational practices, democratic processes and people-centric political outreach”—yet its symbolism is hard to miss.
A New Regime’s Pragmatism
Mr Shah, a 36-year-old former rapper and anti-corruption crusader who rode a wave of youth discontent to victory in the last elections, is signalling a more pragmatic tone than some of his predecessors. Nepal’s traditional political class has often used anti-Indian sentiment to rally domestic support. By admitting mutual encroachments—later clarified by the foreign ministry as referring mainly to “no-man’s land” issues, missing pillars and cross-border farming rather than core sovereignty claims—Mr Shah appears to be lowering the temperature while keeping the door open to dialogue. He also mentioned raising the matter with China and Britain, nodding to the colonial origins of the border and the regional power that looms over the Tibetan plateau.
The reaction at home was swift and sharp. Opposition figures from the Nepali Congress and communist parties demanded Sha’s remarks be expunged from of the parliament’s proceedings. Former diplomats and border experts expressed supprise, arguing that Nepal has no formal record of encroaching on Indian territory and that unresolved pockets are mostly administrative irritants. Yet the prime minister’s willingness to acknowledge complexity may reflect political confidence born of his recent electoral mandate.
Geopolitical Stakes
The dispute matters beyond cartography. Lipulekh Pass is a strategic gateway. For India, it offers a route to Tibet and strengthens its Himalayan defences. For Nepal, it is a matter of sovereignty and national pride. China watches closely. Beijing has deepened ties with Kathmandu in recent years through infrastructure and trade, even as India remains Nepal’s largest trading partner and an indispensable source of remittances, fuel and investment. Any perceived tilt risks complicating Nepal’s delicate balancing act.
The timing of the RSP visit to Delhi is telling. With a new government in Kathmandu keen to deliver on promises of reform and clean governance, functional relations with India are essential. Trade, energy cooperation (Nepal has huge hydropower potential), and the movement of people across the border affect millions of lives daily. At the same time, Mr Shah’s government must manage nationalist expectations at home and navigate wariness of over-reliance on either giant neighbour.
Mr Shah’s call for expert-led, diplomatic resolution is hardly revolutionary—previous governments have tried joint mechanisms with limited success. What is new is the frank admission of mutual fault from Nepal’s highest office and the apparent desire to depoliticise the issue somewhat. Whether this pragmatism survives domestic pressures and produces tangible progress remains to be seen. Himalayan borders have a way of resisting easy solutions. Yet in a region where great-power rivalry casts long shadows, even small steps toward calm can carry outsized significance.
