On May 1st, in the balmy southern Chinese city of Sanya, President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan watched officials from both countries sign a joint-venture agreement and two memorandums of understanding. The pacts cover construction machinery, animal vaccines and medical robots. They are modest in scope but emblematic of a relationship that Beijing and Islamabad describe, without irony, as “all-weather”.
One deal links Sindh’s Livestock and Fisheries Department with Luoyang Modern Biology Group, a Chinese firm, to supply vaccines (including for foot-and-mouth disease) and eventually introduce animal traceability systems. Another involves Pakistan’s Al-Hassan Trade Establishment, China’s Sany (a giant in heavy machinery) and a Hainan partner to supply equipment for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects and, in time, perhaps manufacture some of it locally. The third brings Ziauddin Hospital in Karachi together with Shenzhen Weibang Technology to explore artificial-intelligence-powered medical robots.
These agreements arrive as the two countries mark 75 years of diplomatic ties and as CPEC moves, at least on paper, into a second phase. The first phase was dominated by motorways, power plants and ports; the new one is supposed to emphasise industrialisation, agriculture and technology. Pakistani officials speak earnestly of technology transfer, job creation and “high-quality development”. Sceptics note that many earlier CPEC projects have delivered less than promised, and that Pakistan’s appetite for Chinese capital has often exceeded its capacity to absorb or repay it.
The timing was not accidental. Mr Zardari’s visit coincided with the commissioning in Sanya of Pakistan’s first Hangor-class submarine, built with Chinese help as part of an eight-vessel programme. The juxtaposition of commercial MoUs and a new diesel-electric submarine with air-independent propulsion was lost on no one in New Delhi. Indian strategists see the deepening Sino-Pakistani partnership—economic, industrial and military—as part of China’s effort to secure influence in the Indian Ocean and keep India off balance.
For China, the logic is clear. Pakistan offers a strategic foothold, a route to the Arabian Sea via Gwadar port, and a reliable partner in a region full of complicated democracies. Beijing’s broader Belt and Road Initiative has encountered turbulence elsewhere; in Pakistan it remains a flagship, however troubled. For Islamabad, the relationship is an economic lifeline and a strategic necessity. Pakistan’s economy remains fragile, its debt burden heavy and its politics turbulent. Chinese money, vaccines for its livestock and robots for its hospitals are welcome, even if the terms sometimes raise questions about long-term sovereignty and fiscal sustainability.
Critics, both inside Pakistan and beyond, have long complained about opaque financing, security risks to Chinese workers (several have been killed by militants), and the risk that CPEC deepens Pakistan’s dependence rather than reducing it. Pakistani authorities retort that Chinese investment has brought electricity to a power-starved country and infrastructure to neglected regions. The truth, as usual, lies somewhere in between: CPEC has delivered tangible assets, but its transformative impact on Pakistan’s broader economy has so far been disappointing.
The latest agreements are framework deals rather than fully financed projects. Their real test will be implementation—whether Pakistani industry actually absorbs the promised technology, whether factories materialise, and whether the benefits trickle down beyond a few well-connected provinces. In the past, many CPEC-related MoUs have gathered dust.
Still, the symbolism matters. While much of the world frets about “de-risking” from China, Pakistan is leaning in. As great-power competition sharpens across Asia, the “iron brothers” are quietly extending their embrace into new sectors: from the guts of construction equipment to the biology of livestock and the precision of medical AI. Whether these small steps add up to durable progress for Pakistan’s 240m people, or merely reinforce an unequal partnership, remains the central question of the relationship. For now, both sides prefer to accentuate the positive—and to keep signing documents in pleasant Chinese resort cities.
